EVENTS

The 'Special Relationship' between Britain and the United States of America, particularly from the end of the World War II through to the late 1970s, has been a dynamic and often contentious alliance, marked by shifting global power dynamics, economic dependency, and evolving political strategies.

This period witnessed Britain's decline as a global superpower and America's ascendancy as the new hegemony, a transition fraught with perceived betrayals, moments of cooperation, and significant strategic divergences.

Post-War Economic Collapse and American Assertiveness 

The aftermath of World War II left Britain in a state of severe economic devastation. (See Winston Churchill) Its cities lay in rubble, factories were destroyed, trade had collapsed, and coffers were empty. Despite fighting the war from its inception and bearing its brunt, Britain's survival had been possible only through millions of dollars lent by America.

However, a mere week after Japan's surrender in August 1945, the United States President Harry Truman, abruptly ended Lend-Lease, halting the flow of American money and goods overnight and leaving Britain to face its financial crisis alone.

Lord Keynes, the financial adviser to the British treasury, was immediately dispatched to America to plead for urgent financial assistance, warning the new Labour government that Britain faced a "financial Dunkirk" and risked literal bankruptcy if American aid was not resumed.

In America, a jubilant nation celebrating the return of its troops held the view that the war was concluded successfully, and Britain had no further claim on its generosity. It was a stupid idea for Britain to have engaged in the war at all, and from the American perspective, they had been roped in.

Throughout the war, the United States had been suspicious of Britain's motives, believing that a British aim was to emerge from the conflict with its Empire and trading position intact. A businessman from the State Department, Will Clayton, the world's biggest cotton dealer and a believer in pure competition, thought Britain could not be as poor as it claimed and should "put away the begging bowl".

Britain requested $3.75 billion as a gift, arguing that it had fought "earliest and longest". This argument was considered ludicrous by some.

Many Americans, particularly those who feared the incoming Attlee Labour government, believed the money would be used to subsidise socialism in Great Britain. Public opinion reflected this sentiment, with opinion polls showing 60% against giving Britain help, an unsurprising stance given that over 75% of Americans initially did not want to enter World War II.

The American negotiators drove a hard bargain, insisting that if Britain wanted the loan, it must lower trade barriers to American goods and pay interest on the loan. This provoked an outcry in Britain, with The Economist magazine lamenting that the reward for losing a quarter of national wealth was to pay tribute to those who have been enriched by the war.

Yet, Britain had no option, having denuded ourselves of our resources and with exports having sunk to one-third of 1939 levels. Acceptance of the loan was necessary to avoid a period of tremendous austerity.

Atomic Betrayal and Shifting Power Dynamics 

America emerged from the war not only richer and more powerful but also as the sole possessor of the atomic bomb, developed with British and American scientists working together under a secret agreement between Roosevelt and Churchill that promised continued cooperation post-war.

However, in 1946, Congress passed the McMahon Act, which unilaterally made cooperation on atomic matters with any country, including Britain, an act of treason. This was seen as Churchill making a terrible deal that was immediately reneged on by the Americans, and "a little bit dishonourable".

The McMahon Act was undoubtedly a great blow to Britain. There was a pervasive belief that Britain had played a major role in the foundation and use of nuclear power, and the Churchill-Roosevelt agreement promised ongoing collaboration.

The American decision to shut down this cooperation after the war was largely due to the horrific consequences of the atomic bombs. Britain felt betrayed by Truman's decision, believing it was denied what was hers by right.

The government's scientific adviser stated that not having the bomb would make the British like native levies who were allowed small arms but not artillery. Foreign Secretary Ernest Bevin bluntly declared: "We've got to have this thing over here whatever it costs we've got to have the bloody Union Jack flying on top of it".

The Labour government of this period, including Clement Attlee and Bevin demonstrated more spine, more robust, more patriotic qualities than the Tories. Britain felt betrayed in nearly all the promises from America regarding atomic energy sharing, Lend-Lease, and the Anglo-American Loan, as these obligations were not carried out.

This was scumbag behaviour from the Americans, leaving Britain impotent in the relationship.

American public sentiment towards Britain was largely indifferent. As E.M. Forster observed after visiting the United States, Americans scarcely thought about Britain at all, showing interest only in the Royal Family, Mr Churchill, and British films.

Churchill's Decline and the Cold War's Dawn 

Despite being immediately voted out as prime minister in 1945, Winston Churchill remained a popular figure in America. In 1946, he delivered his famous "Iron Curtain" speech at Fulton, Missouri, urging America to unite with Britain against the growing threat of Russian aggression.

Churchill declared America "the country of the future," while stating that "Great Britain has had its day". This decline, however, is attributed to Churchill himself, who destroyed Britain's economy and totally destroyed the one man in Europe who set his sights on destroying communism.

The creation of the entire scenario of British decline and American ascendancy was considered Churchill's own doing.

Initial American reactions to Churchill's speech were hostile; the public did not wish to be drawn into new alliances, preferring to trust the United Nations to maintain world order. What ultimately changed American attitudes was not fear of Russia, but the severe British economic crisis of 1947.

Newsreels depicted Britain dangerously near collapse, suffering an industrial and financial crisis, with the dollar reserves from the loan nearly exhausted.

Britain's financial woes led to demands for the withdrawal of British troops stationed abroad, including 16,000 engaged in a costly war against communist guerrillas in Greece and more in Turkey.

The British Treasury argued that Britain could no longer sustain an imperial posture. However, Foreign Secretary Ernest Bevin, a socialist from the trade union movement, held a traditional view of Britain as a world power whose interests demanded the protection of Greece and Turkey.

He decided to scare America into taking over, informing Washington that Britain would pull all troops from Greece and Turkey within six weeks, warning of dire consequences for America if these countries fell to Communism.

This was seen as backseat driving American foreign policy, effectively forcing America to pick up the reigns. Truman initially hesitated, citing George Washington's advice to avoid foreign entanglements, but his advisors, convinced by Churchill's Fulton speech, believed he faced a new kind of threat.

This situation represented Britain handing America poison chalices, as the responsibility of global hegemony came with a whole new set of headaches, a burden America was initially reluctant to accept due to its natural isolationist tendencies.

Marshall Plan and the Rise of Anti-Communism 

In 1947, with Europe facing economic, social and political disintegration and Britain having used up its earlier loan, the American Secretary of State George Marshall offered substantial American aid. Britain had no alternative but to accept, as its situation was dire both financially and militarily; it had to hang on to the American Apron Strings or else literally go down the drain to feed its people.

The Marshall Plan required Europeans to plan their recovery together, with Britain taking the lead. The plan was seen as preventing World War III and America's isolation in a communist world. By April 1948, Marshall Aid was approved, providing millions of dollars to Britain and Europe, with supplies all stamped from the USA.

The mood in America shifted dramatically in 1949 when the Soviets exploded their first nuclear bomb, challenging America's atomic supremacy. This, coupled with the Communist takeover in China, fueled a "mood of panic" and the perception of a global "political conspiracy organised by Russia".

The defection of Klaus Fuchs, a German scientist who had worked at Los Alamos on the atomic bomb, further cemented the belief that America was riddled with Communists. A fact that, despite typical historical narratives, was true.

Britain initially viewed America's growing anti-communism as healthy, believing Americans would take out the White Man's Burden everywhere. However, this soon became rather unhealthy and Britain did not share America's view of a "great Russo Chinese monolith" run by Stalin, believing America always sees its enemies as "one entity".

A major concern for Britain was the presence of American Air Force bases in the UK and the risk of retaliation if the United States launched an atomic attack from them or anywhere else without British consent.

Ernest Bevin questioned how Britain could secure its position if the Americans conducted operations from UK airfields before Britain was at war. Evelyn Shakra, a senior foreign office official, noted the dilemma: allowing Britain to be a main forward base for American strategic bombing increased the likelihood of becoming a target for Russian atomic attack.

Despite these concerns, there was an overriding consideration that "Europe couldn't survive without the American Alliance, and Britain had to play such part as the alliance wanted us to play, effectively being occupied and doing what the Americans wanted.

The Korean War (1950-1953), fought under American control in the name of the United Nations, exacerbated British anxieties. The US viewed it as a diversionary tactic by China and Russia. The American Atomic Energy Commission sought the President's permission to send atomic bomb components to Britain, without formally asking or informing the British government, believing the British cabinet could be very slow in decision-making.

The Suez Catastrophe In 1951, Winston Churchill returned to power as Prime Minister, but he was a pathetic shell of a man compared to his wartime persona. His attempts to restore the intimate relationship with America, which he had helped create, were largely unsuccessful.

His impassioned pleas for Anglo-American cooperation drooped like a lead balloon, with President Truman dismissively responding, "thank you Mr Prime Minister we might pass that to our advisers for further consideration". This demonstrated that Churchill's rhetoric about a "special relationship" was pure fantasy.

The Suez Crisis in 1956 brought the 'Special Relationship' to a new low. When Egyptian President Nasser nationalised the internationally owned Suez Canal, Anthony Eden, Churchill's successor, viewed it as a threat to Britain's Empire and a test of Britain's claim to be a world power able to act independently of the United States.

Eden ignored American Secretary of State Dulles's warnings and conspired with France and Israel to seize the canal, keeping the Americans in ignorance. The deception and lies shocked the Americans, particularly President Eisenhower.

Eisenhower, then in the middle of an election campaign and dealing with Russia's invasion of Hungary, was furious, virtually declaring war on Britain and stating that the US was not consulted in any way about any phase of these actions nor were we informed of them in advance.

Eisenhower was determined to stop Britain, believing that a double standard (one for opponents, one for friends) was unacceptable if the world was to improve. He argued Nasser's action was not illegal, thus an invasion constituted gunboat diplomacy that the US would not tolerate from anyone. The American ceasefire motion passed overwhelmingly, 64-5, with even the Soviet Union voting with the United States.

Undeterred, Britain continued its invasion, but Eisenhower, re-elected, used America's economic strength to force Britain's withdrawal.

He leveraged a Sterling crisis, telling the British cabinet that if they did not comply with the UN resolution, America would not provide money to save the pound. This was deemed blackmail but it worked. Britain had failed to anticipate America's sly economic methods to humiliate their supposed allies or the run on Sterling.

The Suez Crisis became official that Britain France and every other country in Europe is just a vassel state of America, as nations that cannot decide who they go to war with are not sovereign. Eden's resignation effectively marked the departure of the last prime minister who was not merely a vassal of the American Empire.

Navigating the Cold War (1956-1979)  The period from the Suez Crisis (1956) until approximately 1979 was a really Rocky period for UK American relations. Harold Macmillan, Eden's successor, attempted to bolster British morale, declaring claims of Britain being a "second or third class power" as nonsense. However, the Suez defeat proved Britain's claim to world power was a sham, demonstrating America's willingness to intervene and frustrate British aims.

Macmillan's most urgent task was to rebuild the shattered alliance. A basic strategy since Thatcher to essentially bend over has been a mistake. Macmillan, however, like other Middle Prime Ministers (Heath, Wilson), attempted to position Britain with some sort of relevance and self-respect.

The launch of the Soviet Sputnik in 1957 shook American confidence. Britain, determined to remain a great power through nuclear weapons, needed a new delivery system for its outdated V bomber force. Eisenhower agreed to sell the Skybolt missile to Macmillan in exchange for Britain accommodating Polaris missile submarines at Holy Loch in Scotland. Macmillan's determination was respected as the right approach to make Britain more relevant.

Macmillan also sought to thaw the Cold War by visiting Soviet leader Khrushchev in 1959, but the summit collapsed after a U2 American spy plane was shot down over Russia. Macmillan was greatly depressed, finding Britain lacked the strength to force the superpowers together. This was the last time Britain would attend a superpower Summit.

The election of John F. Kennedy in 1960 marked a new era in US politics. Macmillan initially worried about establishing a "special relationship" with the younger, "cocky Irishman," but Kennedy responded warmly, calling Macmillan "Uncle Harold" and taking him into his confidence.

This Kennedy-Macmillan relationship was arguably the high point for UK-US relations after the war. During the Cuban Missile Crisis in 1962, Macmillan spoke by telephone with Kennedy nightly, and British advice to publicly release air photographs of the missile sites helped resolve Kennedy's credibility problem. Though Britain's role was ultimately described as only a supporting role.

The relationship faced strain when US Defense Secretary Robert McNamara sought to cancel Skybolt due to cost and delays. This caused consternation in London. Dean Acheson, a revered American statesman, famously declared in 1962 that Great Britain has lost an Empire and has not yet found a role, asserting that the attempt to play a role based on a special relationship with the United States is about played out and that Britain should join Europe. This assessment was basically correct.

Despite American pressure to abandon its nuclear pretensions, Macmillan secured a deal at Nassau in 1962, whereby Britain became the only country apart from the United States to own the new powerful weapon system (Polaris). This was a major achievement from McMillan.

The Nassau agreement, however, inadvertently led to French President Charles de Gaulle's veto of Britain joining the Common Market, as it provided evidence that Britain did not seriously intend to become a European nation. This made the French upset.

Strain Under Johnson and Wilson 

The election of Lyndon Johnson as US President in 1964, possibly the worst president ever, led to a period of growing misunderstanding and distrust with Britain's new Labour Prime Minister, Harold Wilson. Wilson immediately faced a run on Sterling and needed a $4 billion loan, which was agreed upon with strict conditions, including cuts to British spending plans.

American pressure influenced British defence procurement. In 1965, Britain cancelled its own advanced fighter-bomber, the TSR2, under pressure to buy the American F-111, with critics claiming the TSR2 was undoubtedly better than its American alternative.

Significantly, Britain largely sat out the Vietnam War. Wilson's government never formally supported the US attempt to defend South Vietnam, offering only lukewarm support, arbitration attempts, and private criticism of US bombing raids.

Johnson was angry and disappointed, questioning why Britain would not back the US after America had supported Britain in its "darkest hour" during World War II. Dean Rusk, the US Secretary of State, famously confronted a British official, asking why Britain had not sent just one battalion of the black watch, and declaring, "when the Russians invade Sussex don't expect us to come and help you".

Under worsening financial crisis, the Labour government cancelled new aircraft carriers and announced the withdrawal of most overseas troops from the Middle and Far East.

While the United States had always urged Britain to disband its Empire, it became uneasy about Britain's withdrawal at this critical moment, feeling a little bit of lonely feeling as its closest international partner was leaving areas about which the US knew little.

The US was accustomed to Britain sharing the role of international policeman, and its retirement left a gap. The American administration urged Wilson not to cut British forces in the Far East, but Wilson, despite being treated to a reminder of Britain's imperial greatness at a White House reception, proceeded with the cuts. While this general direction was supported by some, it was later undone by Thatcher.

One specific instance of territory transfer was Diego Garcia, a tiny Indian Ocean island that Britain virtually handed over to the United States for use as a giant military base, forcibly removing its thousand residents. In return, America lent Britain millions to help pay for the Polaris missile system. This was an error, although difficult to deny them when it cost us so little.

As Britain shrugged off the responsibilities of Empire, a new Vitality emerged, exemplified by "Swinging London," though critics suggested Britain was sinking giggling into the sea.

However, anti-Vietnam War demonstrations in Britain, where "America is the evil empire" was a prevalent view among young people, shocked the United States more than protests in France or Germany, as Britain had long been regarded as America's "most loyal Ally".

Violent demonstrations outside the American Embassy, including the burning of the US flag, were common. Britain's socialist government, though not formally opposing America's presence in Vietnam, was impotent to wield any influence over US power.

Heath's European Vision and Independence 

Richard Nixon, succeeding Johnson, escalated but then ended the Vietnam War, manoeuvring for peace through engagements with China and Russia. Meanwhile, Britain, under the new Conservative Prime Minister Edward Heath, finally achieved what the United States had urged for so long: full membership in the European Economic Community.

Heath's approach was a correct strategy"and a revolution in Britain's post-war foreign policy. He aimed to play down the special relationship with the United States and emphasise Britain's role as a European country and indeed as a leader of Europe. Heath believed Britain had no future tagging along behind America," asserting that it could only wield influence through Europe.

Heath's independent stance was vividly demonstrated during the Yom Kippur War in October 1973. When Egypt and Syria attacked Israel, with Russia supplying the Arabs and America the Israelis, Europe faced threats to its oil supply if it did not allow its bases to be used by the Americans. Britain, however, engaged in a stampede of disassociation, refusing the US use of British bases. Heath, acting as an "independently minded" prime minister, asserted that his government would be even handed between the Arab world and Israel, stopping supplies to both sides, as leaning to one side was not in British interests.

The Nuclear Alert and Diverging Paths 

During the Yom Kippur War, with Watergate scandal engulfing Washington, the Soviet Union warned that it intended to send its own troops to defend Egypt. Fearing Soviet intervention and believing the US was preoccupied, Washington decided to put forces worldwide on nuclear alert, including American bases in Britain. However, Britain was told nothing until the decision had already been implemented. The US justified this by claiming it could not consult allies due to an immediate threat of Soviet intervention and Europe's prior disassociated stance.

The British, however, believed the situation did not demand a nuclear alert. This refusal by Britain to let the US use its bases, followed by the nuclear alert without consultation, went to the heart of things. The idea that split-second reactions precluded joint decision-making on nuclear matters was dismissed as "mythology," arguing that intelligence warnings would provide sufficient time for consultation.

Twelve hours after the alert, the Soviets backed down, but in Washington, there was mounting fury at Europe's behaviour. President Nixon issued a warning, stating that Europeans and Americans must sit down and determine that we are either going to go along together on both the security and the economic and political fronts or we will go separately. There was growing pressure in the United States to bring troops home and let Europe defend itself.

At this juncture, Britain faced a stark choice: continue to make its own way within a united Europe or "revert to her old Sanctuary under the eagle's wing". Unfortunately, this decision was ultimately made by Margaret Thatcher, who undid the independent course pursued by the "Middle Prime Ministers" like Macmillan, Wilson, and Heath, and effectively led Britain to "bend over" to American interests.