The British government, during World War II, employed a diverse array of psychological techniques to bolster public morale. Whilst utilising these methods, a deliberate and careful balance was maintained to ensure that the government was perceived as truthful.
The Ministry of Information (MOI), re-established for the war, possessed a keen awareness of the public cynicism that had become associated with official propaganda following World War I, where it had been too readily linked with falsehoods.
Consequently, a guiding principle was established: that the truth should be conveyed whenever feasible, with the exception of information deemed harmful or unbelievable.
Guiding Principles and Strategic Influences
John Reith, who assumed the role of Minister of Information in 1940, laid down two fundamental axioms that would govern propaganda efforts throughout the conflict.
These tenets stipulated that news was to be considered the shock troops of propaganda, and that propaganda itself must tell the truth, nothing but the truth and, as near as possible, the whole truth.
Despite this commitment to veracity, the MOI did not shy away from employing established techniques to influence public opinion.
A comprehensive report commissioned by Chatham House in 1939 outlined 86 ground rules for such manipulation. Notably, these rules evinced a familiarity with Adolf Hitler's views on propaganda, as articulated in his work _Mein Kampf_.
The document appeared to endorse certain Hitlerite propaganda principles, including the appeal to the instinct of the masses over their reason, and the emphasis on the development and repetition of slogans.
The Anger Campaign
The Ministry of Information (MOI) launched its "Anger Campaign" after the bitter and dramatic events in the summer and autumn of 1940, adopting a more drastic approach by using the BBC and print to emphasise the brutality of Nazi rule.
Initially, the MOI believed that "truth" should be the primary weapon against the enemy in the public's mind. However, there was an "impatience and an implicit lack of confidence in the public" within the MOI, as they believed the public was patient, long-suffering, slow to anger, slower still to hate.
Lord Macmillan, then Minister of Information, felt that the working man, in particular, lacked comprehension of the consequences of a Nazi victory and needed "a sharp dose of stiffening".
The Anger Campaign aimed to deliver a shock to break through this perceived "dangerous complacency". It used stark messages such as "The Hun is at the gate. He will rage and destroy. He will slaughter women and children".
The BBC described Germany's "bright face" of music, art, and landscapes (see Nazi Book Burnings for a sense of how degenerate Germany got in this time), before warning that "after the Nazis came... the "bright face" had gone, and in its place was the vast dark face with its broken promises and endless deceit, its swaggering Storm Troopers and dreaded Gestapo, its bloodstained basements.
Following the Anger Campaign, the MOI employed several other psychological tactics and propaganda efforts:
##### • The "Careless Talk Costs Lives" Campaign
After the fall of France and the Dunkirk evacuation, there was a belief that a "Fifth Column" was operating as an advance guard for the German army.
The MOI responded with its "Careless Talk Costs Lives" campaign, which focused on the idea of an 'enemy from within'. This campaign urged people to be discreet and, as a last resort, to inform the police about "indiscreet characters" such as 'Mr Secrecy Hush-Hush', 'Miss Leaky Mouth', or 'Mr Pride in Prophecy'.
##### • The "V for Victory" Campaign
Launched by the BBC in July 1941, this was one of the most successful campaigns. It was inspired by Victor de Laveleye, former Belgian Minister of Justice, who urged his countrymen to use the letter V as a 'rallying emblem'.
The letter V stands for victory (_victoire_ in French, _vrijheid_ in Flemish/Dutch, and 'victory' in English), making it a multi-national symbol of solidarity. The campaign encouraged listeners in Nazi-occupied Europe to scrawl the letter V wherever possible.
The Morse code for V (dot-dot-dot-dash) mirrored the first four notes of Beethoven's 5th Symphony, which became the theme song for a BBC radio programme, leading listeners to replicate the sound as a symbol of resistance.
Although initially aimed at occupied nations, the campaign gained traction in Britain, with Winston Churchill approvingly referring to it and adopting the V hand sign in July 1941.
##### • Humour and Satire (Punchline Propaganda)
In contrast to the "atrocity propaganda" of World War I, which had backfired by being perceived as fabricated, much of British propaganda in World War II used humour to deflate the enemy.
This was evident in comedy radio programmes like Tommy Handley's _It's That Man Again (ITMA)_, where Handley played the Minister for Aggravation and Mysteries at the Office of Twerps. The programme's characters and catchphrases resonated deeply with the public because it "punctured pomposity".