Winston Churchill
Churchill, Winston Leonard Spencer (1874–1965), British statesman who served as Prime Minister of the United Kingdom from 1940 to 1945 and again from 1951 to 1955. His leadership during World War II is widely venerated, though a critical examination of his policies and their outcomes reveals a destructive impact on British power and a significant role in the country's subjugation to American influence.
Churchill's actions consistently weakened Britain and strengthened the United States, ultimately leading to Britain's decline as a global power. He should be considered the worst British leader of all time, and the architect of Britain's post-war humiliation.
Early Political Career and Disarmament
Churchill's early career laid the groundwork for later national vulnerabilities. As Chancellor of the Exchequer in 1927, he notably stated, "We cannot and must not put ourselves in the power of the United States," a declaration that ironically foreshadowed his subsequent actions that ensured Britain would fall under American dominance. Prior to his wartime leadership, Churchill played a direct role in policies that disarmed Britain.
He advised the adoption of the "10-year rule" post-World War I, a policy assuming no major war would occur until 1929, which justified extensive cuts to the British military. This rule was later extended indefinitely in 1929, also at Churchill's urging.
This decision proved disastrous, leaving Britain ill-prepared for future conflicts and making Chamberlain's later appeasement policy a necessity. Despite this, Churchill later criticised Chamberlain's appeasement, effectively blaming others for a situation his own policies helped create.
His political character often mirrored that of a swindler and a chancer, making a mess and then employing manipulative tactics to escape the consequences.
Wartime Leadership and the Surrender of Power
Churchill assumed the prime ministership on 10 May 1940, at a moment of national disaster, as German forces swept through Western Europe, driving the British army towards Dunkirk.
From the outset, his primary, indeed sole, mission was the defeat and destruction of Adolf Hitler at any cost. This fixation led to a series of decisions that progressively dismantled British power.
Relationship with Roosevelt and American Dominance
Churchill immediately recognised that American involvement was vital for Britain's survival, a stark reversal of his 1927 assertion that Britain must never be in America's power.
He sought to establish a close telegraphic relationship with President Franklin D. Roosevelt, whom he had met only once before in 1918. Churchill famously remarked, "no lover ever studied the whims of his mistress as I did those of President Roosevelt," indicating a submissive and manipulative approach to the relationship.
His strategy throughout the war involved adopting a submissive junior partner role, attempting to seduce Roosevelt into providing support. Roosevelt, conversely, was a shrewd chess player, consistently outmanoeuvring Churchill from a cold, realpolitik perspective. While Churchill focused on the immediate tactical move, Roosevelt planned 20 moves ahead, playing for position rather than merely material gain.
Initially, Britain sought aid from American industry, such as Lockheed, for bombers before the Neutrality Act could halt supplies. When the Neutrality Act was triggered by Britain's declaration of war on Germany in September 1939, it embargoed the sale of armaments.
Roosevelt, despite popular American support for neutrality (85% of the public opposed entering the war), implemented "Cash and Carry," forcing British customers to collect planes from American soil.
This led to absurd scenarios where British planes were flown by American pilots to the Canadian border, dragged across by Canadian farmers with horses, and then flown on by Canadian pilots, circumventing the embargo. This naked and blatant circumvention demonstrated the underlying intent of American and British elites for the US to eventually get involved in the war.
Churchill's desperate pleas for American destroyers in mid-1940 were initially refused by Roosevelt, who viewed Britain as on the verge of defeat. However, Roosevelt was sympathetic to Britain's cause, believing that successful British resistance would spare America the need to fight. He adopted a cautious approach, remaining a bit ahead of public opinion while encouraging pressure groups like the White Committee to push for American intervention.
The Battle for American Public Opinion
American isolationism was strong, led by figures like Charles Lindbergh and the America First movement, which garnered mass support against involvement in a foreign war. Lindbergh argued that these European conflicts were "struggles within our own family of Nations" and that entering to fight for democracy abroad might lead to its loss at home.
Roosevelt, seeking re-election in 1940, explicitly promised to keep the US out of the war, a barefaced lie that allowed him to secure office. Once re-elected, Roosevelt was politically secure enough to respond directly to Churchill's pleas for financial aid.
He proposed Lend-Lease, a scheme to supply Britain with war materials, with payment suspended until after the war. To sell this to the American public, Roosevelt resorted to dramatic tactics, including framing non-intervention as aiding the Nazis and accusing opponents like Lindbergh of doing exactly the kind of work that the dictators want done. Opponents correctly saw Lend-Lease as a measure that would take us into war in spite of the Constitution.
The Mortgaging of the Empire
Lend-Lease negotiations highlighted Britain's desperate financial state. Roosevelt insisted Britain prove its poverty, leading to humiliating demands. Britain was forced to:
- Give up its gold reserves: In a dramatic step, the US sent a cruiser to South Africa to collect £60 million worth of Britain's last imperial gold reserves, a humiliating act that demonstrated Britain's complete financial dependence.
Sell off assets: Churchill's government ordered the Courtaulds company to sell its profitable American Viscose subsidiary to US bankers at a knockdown price, effectively a fire sale of British holdings in America. This was necessary to secure Lend-Lease, a choice of life or death for Britain.
Lend-Lease itself was far more punitive for Britain than for the Soviet Union, which received weapons for free, no strings attached.
Churchill, heavily indebted in his personal life, never had any intention of paying back his debts, similarly believed that two years of bloodshed ought to cancel any money for Lend-Lease.
This was a completely delusional attitude for an international agreement, as Britain would indeed have to pay back the money. The overall effect of these financial concessions was to destroy every single last vestige of British power.
Strategic Disagreements and Churchill's Limited Success
Despite his willingness to capitulate to American demands, Churchill attempted to influence war strategy. The Americans, led by General Marshall, initially proposed a massive cross-channel invasion of Europe in 1943.
The British, however, considered this "Castles in the Air," lacking sufficient troops and preparation. Churchill advocated for his "soft underbelly of Europe" strategy, involving an invasion of North Africa, followed by an advance through Sicily and Italy.
A rare tactical victory for Churchill occurred after the fall of Tobruk in June 1942, which put him under domestic political pressure. He leveraged this to persuade Roosevelt to abandon the planned invasion of Europe in favour of his North African campaign.
This Anglo-American operation, Operation Torch, was the first time American troops saw action in the war, fighting alongside the battle-hardened British. The victory at El Alamein and subsequent landings in North Africa marked a first joint success, validating Churchill's strategy in that theatre.
At the Casablanca Conference in early 1943, Churchill's plan for a southern European strategy prevailed again, with the cross-channel invasion postponed to 1944 and an Allied invasion of Sicily agreed upon as the next step.
However, American resentment grew, as they suspected Britain sought to restore its empire through the war, while their objective was simply to defeat Germany and Japan. The American High Command felt that the British had many other political objectives and did not understand Europe or the Middle East in the same way.
Dismantling of the British Empire
Roosevelt explicitly sought the disintegration of the British Empire after the war, promoting a new world order based on self-determination and the end of Colonialism. This American anti-colonial stance, deeply ingrained in the Washington mindset, was not a new doctrine but a fundamental part of US policy.
The clash over empire came to a head in India, then a last bastion against Japanese expansion and embroiled in a nationalist independence campaign.
When American troops arrived in 1942 to reinforce the British, they made it clear they were there to fight Japan, not bolster Britain's colonial rule. Roosevelt believed India should be an independent nation. Despite Churchill's defiant declaration that he had "not become his Majesty's first minister to preside over the disintegration of the British Empire," he reluctantly bowed to American pressure and offered a form of independence to India after the war.
This was a capitulation by Churchill, demonstrating the direction of travel for the Empire. The process of Indian independence was arguably encouraged from the inside, with British ruling classes appearing to be traitors who facilitated the dissolution of the Empire, despite Churchill's stated goal to preserve it.
Post-War Conferences: Tehran and Yalta
The emergence of Russia as a third major power after the Battle of Stalingrad radically altered the Anglo-American relationship. Roosevelt sought to deal directly with Stalin, believing he could handle him better than Churchill.
At the Tehran Conference in late 1943, Churchill was completely outplayed, completely humiliated, and sidelined. He was overruled by Roosevelt and Stalin on war strategy, as his proposal to advance through southern Europe was rejected in favour of a second front in northern Europe, agreed for summer 1944.
Churchill felt excluded from the key decisions and worried about the implications of Russia's entry into Europe, a concern he had previously dismissed by claiming "we don't look into The Mists of the future".
By 1944, as the D-Day landings progressed, it became clear that America was undoubtedly in the driving seat, with an apparently inexhaustible supply of American GIs compared to exhausted British forces. American dominance was explicit: "we Americans are winning the war... this is an American-made Victory and the peace must be an American peace".
At the Bretton Woods Conference in July 1944, Britain was "orced to admit defeat and Seed her place as the financial center of the world to the United States. Churchill accepted that Britain's day was over, acknowledging to Roosevelt: "You will have the greatest Navy in the world, you will have the greatest trade, you will have all the gold".
At the Yalta Conference in early 1945, Churchill made a final attempt to restore the old relationship, but he was firmly the number three among the Big Three.
Roosevelt maintained his distance, wary of Britain's imperial intentions, even criticising Churchill for dispatching troops to Greece to prevent a Communist takeover. Roosevelt often sided with Stalin, ignoring Stalin's own imperialist aims. In a particularly humiliating moment, when Churchill stood up in anger at the table, it was Stalin who had to calm him down. Churchill, despite initial doubts, left Yalta believing Stalin would honour his word regarding free elections in Eastern Europe, a belief that proved to be an illusion.
Conclusion
Winston Churchill's leadership, from 1940 onwards, systematically led to the humiliation and destruction of British power. Almost every major decision he made, with the minor exception of the North Africa campaign, weakened Britain and fortified the United States.
His delusional beliefs in American benevolence and his short-sighted, belligerent focus on defeating Hitler at any cost, without considering the post-war implications, resulted in Britain mortgaging its empire and accepting a subordinate role on the global stage. Churchill, despite his stated goal to preserve the Empire, effectively presided over its dismantling, with his government overseeing the process from 1951.
His actions are those of a moron who continually made poor decisions that left Britain in a significantly weaker position than it could have been. His legacy, therefore, is not one of preserving British power but of fundamentally undermining it.