Civilisations follow a cyclical pattern of growth, prosperity, and eventual decline, a phenomenon recognised by numerous profound thinkers.
#### The Spark and the Imperial Altar
Every civilisation or empire begins not with a moralising, universal church, but with a bursting forth of a barbarian group. This early warrior caste embodies a crude approximation of solar masculine energy, driven by a particularist religion that fosters a powerful Asabiyyah - or ingroup solidarity, essential for conquest and expansion.
This spirit manifests as the battle of friend against enemy, in-group versus out-group, crusade versus jihad.
Examples include the Mongols, the early Arab conquests led by Muhammad, and the raiders who forged the Holy Roman Empire. Their religions are not universalising, but practically believe in magic, reflecting an "age of fear" and a genuine, primal awe.
As a civilisation grows and consolidates its gains, a different strain of religion comes to predominate: the 'imperial altar'. These are universalising, moralising religions, or "universal churches," which serve chiefly as a political technology to maintain a multiethnic empire.
While vital for solving problems of law and order and social cohesion across diverse peoples, the imperial altar is an "exterior" or "exoteric" institution, distinct from the original animating spirit. It can help maintain a civilisation for a time, but it was not its ultimate cause, and therefore, it cannot save it from collapse once the initial spark is a distant memory. The difference lies between the heroic spirit of early raiders and the later rulers' need for administrative control.
#### Civilisational Success Breeds Its Own Loss Conditions
Civilisational successes, such as conquest, wealth, and education, paradoxically generate their own loss conditions. Prosperity leads to intellectualism, idealism, and humanitarianism, often fostering robust education systems.
However, societies mistakenly attribute their greatness to these effects rather than to the root cause: conquest and the underlying force that establishes order. As people grow richer, their appetite for violence diminishes, and they forget that order is ultimately based on force.
Historically, this transition is marked by a circulation from 'lions' to 'foxes' among the elite. The rise of intellectuals, often seen as a sign of progress, is, in fact, a harbinger of accelerated decline.
Thinkers like Socrates, though celebrated as founders of Western civilisation, are better understood as figures of the decadent aftermath of greatness, their "barbarism of reflection" directly contributing to the downfall of the earlier periods of Homer.
#### The Double Tragedy: Intellectuals and Conservatives
The advent of intellectuals creates a double tragedy. Firstly, they attack and weaken the imperial altar, which is crucial for holding the empire together. Secondly, their critique inadvertently gives rise to Conservatives.
These individuals mistakenly believe the imperial altar to be the cause of civilisational greatness, rather than its effect. Consequently, they devote their energy to preserving a weakened institution instead of the original animating spirit. This fundamental misunderstanding renders conservatives "always losers" in the grand sweep of history.
The presence of conservatives is almost always a bad sign, indicating a commitment to preservation rather than growth. As it is a principle that "that which is not growing is dying," an empire focused on maintaining rather than expanding is already on a path to decline.
The original spark, the very essence of civilisational vitality, is diminished by both intellectual deconstruction and conservative efforts to uphold what is merely an effect, not the cause.
#### The Antagonisms of Castes: Lions and Foxes
Society can broadly be divided into four basic castes, which display mutual antagonisms: the lion archetype (warriors and peasants) and the fox archetype (priests/intellectuals and merchants).
Warriors and peasants share similar sensibilities, representing the 'lion' spirit. In the early period of a civilisation, the warrior type initiates the spark and establishes order, often leading to a feudal system.
The two 'fox' types introduce complications. Priests help to establish the imperial altar, which, despite its lunar quality, is necessary for maintaining the empire. Merchants naturally arise from the safety and order provided by warriors, as trade flourishes within protected borders.
There can be a period of symbiosis, known as 'high noon,' where the remnants of the warrior caste work hand-in-hand with a merchant caste to produce prosperity.
However, prosperity inevitably ushers in a second wave of intellectuals – deconstructionists who aim to tear down the imperial altar rather than erect it.
This situation can only be arrested by the emergence of a Caesar, a people's champion who embodies the hopes of the peasantry. When the lion archetype (monarchism or Caesarism) predominates, strong regimes emerge through ruthlessness. Y
et, such strength ironically leads to the demands of Managerialism growth and complexity, which in turn facilitate the return of 'fox' elites. The lion type, due to the very successes it creates, can never maintain power indefinitely.
When the fox archetype predominates (theocracy by priests/intellectuals or plutocracy by merchants), civilisational success may accelerate, but the foundations that enabled it are eroded. Ultimately, this leads to collapse. The character and nature of the elites are paramount, as the course of a civilisation is largely a function of their qualities.
#### The Reign of Quantity and Incommunicable Civilisations
A pervasive feature of the late pre-collapse cycle is the phenomenon where quantity takes on a quality of its own. This manifests as mass democracy, utilitarianism, standardisation, and the systematic destruction of quality and distinction.
This reign of quantity is an assault on everything unique and qualitative, flattening society to the mediocre level of the mean. This process, often referred to as entropy, signifies a loss of distinctiveness.
Furthermore, individuals of one civilisational season cannot truly embody the spirit of another. The "children of the winter" cannot embody the "spring." A 'great man' or 'Caesar' cannot simply be manufactured; their emergence requires specific conditions of struggle and suffering—not trivial hardships, but profound, transformative experiences. It is impossible to jump from a life of modern comfort to the spirit of a Genghis Khan.
Perhaps one of the most important lessons is that civilisation is incommunicable. The "world feeling of a people" is not transferable. What one group adopts from another - be it ideas, customs, or even admiration - is merely a "name, dress, and mask" for its own existing feeling, never the genuine spirit of the original.
This explains why attempts to adopt foreign civilisational traits often appear inauthentic; one cannot simply borrow a people's soul.
Finally, ethnicity is a constant reality. It promotes in-group solidarity in the early cycle, a critical component of the 'spark'. However, in the late cycle, it often becomes a significant problem for the ruling class to manage, contributing to social friction and disunity.
#### Modern Challenges to Cyclical History
Despite the pervasive evidence, these cyclical conclusions are deeply at odds with modern post-1945 thinking, which emphasises peace, diversity, equality, and inclusion. The modern imperial altar, with its progressive ideals, is profoundly different from the spark that initiated Western Civilisation through events like the Crusades.
Modern successes, like wealth and education, have demonstrably failed to resolve societal maladies; instead, they have accelerated them.
The fox archetype reigns supreme, often through increasingly transparent and crude cunning, while quality and distinction are suppressed in a standardised, globalised world.
Brooks Adams, a perceptive observer, believed that the modern age might represent the end of cyclical history due to three primary reasons:
1. Modern technology and policing methods might place elites beyond attack. However, history demonstrates this is not necessarily true.
The collapse of modern states like the USSR, despite advanced policing methods, proves that technological superiority does not guarantee immunity from internal elite disunity or a shift from a 'soft managerial' regime (persuasion) to a 'hard managerial' regime (force). The ultimate determinant remains the collective will and unity of the elites.
2. The world has been effectively colonised, leaving no more barbarians to supply fresh energy for a new cycle. Yet, modern analogues of the 'spark' barbarian groups, incubated in hostile frontier conditions, still exist.
These could include mountain and desert militias, paramilitary groups, cartels in quasi-autonomous regions, or even certain populations within established nations who face prolonged struggle and thus generate intense 'Asabiyyah'. Such groups, however, are more likely to emerge and lead a new cycle in a post-collapse environment rather than directly confront existing military powers.
3. Global capitalism means Asia, with its cheaper labour and faster birth rates, would eclipse Europe in the long run. While this shift towards Eastern dominance is undeniable, the cyclical pattern suggests that success breeds its own loss conditions.
If the East achieves dominance for a period, it too will face decline, creating harsher conditions in the West, which in turn could foster new reservoirs of 'asabaya' and spirit, potentially leading to a new 'spark'. This is encapsulated in the enduring truth that "hard times create strong men, strong men create good times, good times create weak men, weak men create hard times."
Spangler, another key cyclical theorist, anticipated a period of Caesarism that would tame the 'money power'. However, it remains an open question whether this period has already concluded with the major global conflicts of the 20th century, suggesting that the 'money power' might have achieved an indefinite victory, leading to a "thousand-year mukworld" of standardised Consumerism. Whether states still possess the power to rein in global capital through force remains a critical unresolved issue for the future.
Ultimately, the study of civilisational cycles reveals a profound, recurring pattern in human history, offering a sobering perspective on the transient nature of power, prosperity, and the delicate balance between order and vitality.