Mutually Assured Destruction

Mutually Assured Destruction, often referred to by its acronym MAD, emerged as a pivotal concept in international relations during the Cold War, fundamentally reshaping strategic thinking regarding nuclear weapons.

This doctrine posited that a full-scale use of Atomic Weapons by two opposing sides would result in the complete annihilation of both the attacker and the defender. It was a terrifying, yet paradoxically stabilising, framework that underscored the devastating consequences of nuclear conflict, making its actualisation inconceivable.

The Genesis and Core Concepts of MAD

The development of nuclear weapons and the subsequent arms race between the United States and the Soviet Union necessitated a new strategic paradigm. The "delicate balance of terror," a term coined by strategist Wolster, described a state where the Cold War became "safer" because both superpowers understood that any nuclear attack would trigger a retaliatory strike, leading to their mutual destruction. This understanding was enforced by systems designed to ensure that even if one side launched a first strike, the other would retain enough nuclear capability to destroy the aggressor in return. This included hundreds of missiles protected in underground silos and fleets of bombers on constant 24-hour alert.

Key figures and institutions played a crucial role in developing and popularising MAD's underlying theories. The RAND Corporation, a prominent military think tank established around 1947-48, was instrumental in this regard, focusing on "systems and ways of doing things" rather than specific weaponry, and incorporating human behaviour into their analyses.

• Herman Kahn: A chief strategist at Rand, Kahn controversially posited that nuclear war was, in fact, winnable. His theories explored scenarios of "selective strikes" and holding back missiles to threaten cities and force submission, challenging the notion of a single, all-encompassing "spasm kind of war". Kahn even imagined cities being evacuated multiple times a decade as America engaged in "brinkmanship" with the Soviets, believing everyone could be taught to think "rationally about nuclear war".

John Nash: The mathematical genius, subject of the film A Beautiful Mind, applied Game Theory to human interaction, including the nuclear standoff. Nash's "mathematical models" were used to predict how the Soviets would behave in response to American actions. His infamous "fuck you buddy" game illustrated that the "rational choice was always to betray the other person," as this would maximise one's own gain while minimising risk. This grim assumption that human beings were constantly "suspicious and self-interested" formed the "underlying gamefield" of MAD, suggesting that stability could be achieved even in a hostile, competitive world. The "Nash equilibrium" theorised a point where everyone's self-interest was "perfectly balanced".

The Paradox and Critiques of MAD's Rationality

Despite its mathematical underpinnings, MAD relied heavily on the assumption that all actors involved were "rational". However...

• Human Irrationality: When tested in real-world scenarios, such as the "prisoners dilemma" game played with Rand Corporation secretaries, the "rational strategy" of betrayal often failed. Instead, the secretaries "always trusted each other and decided to cooperate," suggesting a disconnect between theoretical models and actual human behaviour. Ironically, John Nash himself suffered from "paranoid schizophrenia," raising questions about the very foundation of his theories.
• Illusion of Control: The idea of a "controlled nuclear exchange" was met with deep scepticism by those on the front lines. One former official expressed being "scared to death" of a nuclear exchange and never truly believed it "could have been controlled". President Kennedy notably "ignored any idea of controlled War," opting instead for a policy of immediate, massive retaliation if even "just one missile" was launched from Cuba, demonstrating that the Cold War truly worked "through fear, not reason". Even Robert McNamara, a key architect of the Vietnam War and a proponent of rational analysis, eventually "began to back away from the elaborate plans for controlling nuclear war".

The Perpetuation of Fear: MAD, in essence, transformed "fear" into the primary "control mechanism". This was intensified by politicians and strategists who found the "rational approach irresistible," even elevating it to a "substitute for religion" – a belief that "scientific means" could solve political problems.

Evolution and Contemporary Challenges

The landscape of fear began to shift with the era of detente. In 1972, President Nixon and Henry Kissinger signed treaties limiting nuclear arms, proclaiming the "beginning of the end of that era" of fear. However, this "world without fear was not what the Neoconservatives needed" to advance their agenda.

• The Neocon Strategy: Figures like Donald Rumsfeld, Richard Pipes, and Paul Wolfowitz actively sought to dismantle Kissinger's vision. They exaggerated the Soviet threat, alleging secret weapons build-ups. Through groups like the "Committee on the Present Danger," they propagated a simplistic fiction of the Soviet Union as the "center of all evil," aiming to re-engage the American public in a grand vision of America's destiny.This strategy involved presenting a constantly looming hidden threat that could strike at any time, thereby maintaining political power by offering "protection from nightmares". This tactic was later applied to new enemies, transforming failing movement like certain Islamist groups into a powerful "phantom enemy". Even the threat of a "dirty bomb," while capable of causing panic, was an illusion with negligible radioactive danger.
• MAD in the Modern Era: The original logic of MAD seems to have been inverted. While Cold War MAD prevented attacks, there is a weirdly casual approach to nuclear war, with current leaders seemingly having abandoned all of this (Game Theory).Events like Iran and Israel attacking each other, and rhetoric from politicians openly calling for or risking nuclear conflict with Russia, occur in a climate where the threat of nuclear apocalypse seems disregarded. This leads to a nuclear bomb paradox, where even if nukes are real, everyone behaves as if they're fake. The hutzpah strategy of continually poking the Russian bear" or other adversaries without apparent fear of escalation highlights a departure from the assumed rationality of the Cold War era.This shift suggests that the assumption of rational actors might now be over, leading to an uncharted territory where "mad ideological spurs" rather than cold calculation might drive global events. Figures such as Robert McNamara and Henry Kissinger, who once navigated the dangers of MAD with a certain competence, are no longer at the helm, raising questions about the stability of the current global order.

In essence, while MAD successfully deterred global nuclear conflict for decades by weaponising fear and relying on a paradoxical rationality, its historical context and underlying assumptions have since been challenged. The simple structures of the Cold War was beginning to disappear, giving way to a world where old strategic frameworks no longer seem to apply, and a dangerous nonchalance towards existential threats prevails.