EVENTS | 1982
The Falklands War, a brief but intense conflict in the South Atlantic during 1982, represented a critical juncture in Anglo-American relations, significantly reviving what had become, by the late 1970s, a diminished Britain's 'Special Relationship' with the USA.
While America retained a fondness for British traditions and the monarchy, Britain was increasingly regarded as merely another friendly ally. The war, however, compelled Britain to seek American assistance, underscoring its reliance on the transatlantic alliance.
The Argentinian Invasion and British Response
The conflict commenced with the invasion of British sovereign territory by Argentinian Armed Forces, who swiftly established military control over the Falkland Islands. In response, the British government, led by Prime Minister Margaret Thatcher, made the decisive decision to dispatch a large task force to the South Atlantic. This resolute action and the subsequent British victory in the Falklands were widely considered to be the primary factors behind Thatcher's landslide re-election in 1983, overshadowing the economic policies of her government.
American Predicament and Initial Stance
The British decision to send a task force caught Washington by surprise, as the United States had not been consulted. President Ronald Reagan was immediately confronted with a significant diplomatic dilemma: a potential war between Britain, America's closest NATO partner, and Argentina, a nation whose support the Reagan administration sought for its anti-communist efforts in Central America. To navigate this sensitive situation, President Reagan publicly declared American neutrality in the conflict and instructed his Secretary of State, Alexander Haig, to pursue a peaceful settlement.
Haig's diplomatic mission began in London, where he encountered Prime Minister Thatcher's unyielding resolve. Thatcher firmly communicated that no diplomatic compromise was acceptable unless Argentina fully complied with the United Nations resolution by withdrawing all its forces from the Falklands. Her demeanour was combative. During discussions, Thatcher reportedly had paintings of Wellington and Nelson displayed, stating, I do not intend to repeat the mistake of Neville Chamberlain, who said "Why should we go to war for a far distant nation about which we know so little and with which we have so little in common". This historical reference underscored her determination to avoid any perceived appeasement or abandonment of British territory.
Britain's government harboured significant apprehension, fearing a repeat of the Suez Crisis three decades prior, during which the United States had undermined British efforts to regain control of the Suez Canal due to conflicting American interests in the Middle East. Determined to prevent such an occurrence, Britain embarked on a campaign to garner American public support. This involved emphasising fundamental principles such as self-determination and the unacceptable nature of aggression, appealing directly to American values. Additionally, there was a conscious effort to leverage America's historical and cultural affinity for the British Navy, aiming to secure an emotional and strategic alignment.
The Need for Covert Assistance
The logistical challenges confronting the British task force were formidable. Operating 8,000 miles from home, British troops would face a hostile environment without critical radar protection against enemy aircraft, guaranteed fuel supplies, or sufficient intelligence regarding enemy movements. Such conditions rendered a direct assault on the Falkland Islands exceptionally difficult. The inherent difficulties of openly soliciting American support were compounded by the declared US neutrality and internal divisions within the American administration.
Within the American government, some officials advocated for maintaining strict neutrality, citing the United States' significant strategic interests and diplomatic investments in its relations with Latin American nations. Furthermore, it was noted that Britain had frequently adopted a position of neutrality regarding American conflicts with other nations, such as during the Vietnam War, suggesting that a reciprocal stance from the US would not introduce a new dynamic into the bilateral relationship.
Despite these complexities, Britain understood the imperative of American assistance. However, open alignment by the United States risked alienating the new allies cultivated in South America, while a failure to support Britain could lead to the defeat of a crucial NATO ally. Consequently, with official American neutrality precluding overt requests for support, the British government opted for a strategy of extreme secrecy. They approached senior officials within the American Department of Defense whom they believed could be trusted not to betray an old ally.
The Covert Operation: Caspar Weinberger's Role
At the forefront of this covert assistance was then-US Secretary of Defense, Caspar Weinberger. Without seeking formal cabinet approval, Weinberger issued direct instructions to his deputies to provide Britain with every requested item as swiftly as possible. This unprecedented level of cooperation was facilitated through private channels that had been meticulously maintained between the two nations' navies since the World War II.
The vast majority of the American administration remained unaware of the full extent of this clandestine operation. While President Reagan himself was cognisant of the actions being taken, no deliberate effort was made to hide the assistance, rather it was not publicly announced. Instead, officials simply did not go out of their way to inform others. The pre-existing, close relationship between the US and British navies meant that support flowed continuously, and during the crisis, the volume of this support was merely intensified.
Almost immediately following the order for the British task force to proceed, Weinberger's counterpart in London was contacted to provide a comprehensive assessment of the Argentinian forces' operational effectiveness. This intelligence was invaluable, stemming from the fact that the United States Navy regularly conducted joint exercises with various South American navies, including Argentina's. This afforded them intimate knowledge of Argentinian naval capabilities and tactical approaches, which was subsequently provided to the British in extensive detail.
Logistical Lifeline and Strategic Implications
The logistical support provided by the United States proved to be the most critical aspect of their assistance, particularly the indispensable use of the airfield at Ascension Island. This US Airbase became a vital staging post, sealed off from external observation. Transport planes ferried supplies from American stockpiles around the clock, feeding them to the ships of the British task force as they paused on their southward journey.
Pentagon officials orchestrating this covert aid fully comprehended that public revelation of the operation's full scale would severely damage America's standing, especially among Latin American nations, who were already aware of the impact of the aid. This strategic calculation carried a tangible cost: the Argentines and other Latin American countries abruptly ceased their support for US efforts against communist forces in Central America, a consequence that ultimately contributed to the Contragate affair.
Despite the ongoing provision of equipment and supplies to Britain, Secretary Haig continued to publicly uphold America's official posture of neutrality, shuttling between London and Buenos Aires in pursuit of a diplomatic resolution. Haig posited that the military aid might, paradoxically, encourage greater British flexibility in negotiations.
Meanwhile, Argentina, though unaware of the specific details of the aid, accused the United States of providing far more support than was actually the case. This complex dual approach was described as a peculiar form of even-handedness, drawing historical parallels to instances of American neutrality during the Second World War, such as the provision of 100 destroyers to Britain or the firing upon German submarines in the North Atlantic. One US official remarkably characterised this support as the "atavistic business of blood and language," underscoring the deep-seated, albeit often unstated, cultural and historical ties.
Public sentiment in America also played a role, with many ordinary citizens expressing discontent over their country's official neutrality. The British Embassy received numerous letters offering support, and even money, including a notable offer of free services from an ex-Marine in Texas. By the end of April 1982, American negotiators concluded that a diplomatic resolution was no longer feasible. Consequently, in a dramatic shift in public policy, Secretary Haig announced that the United States would formally respond to British requests for material support. This announcement, however, artfully bypassed the fact that British ships were already heavily laden with American-provided weaponry.
The Battle and American Weaponry
On the morning of 21 May 1982, British troops initiated their assault on the Falkland Islands at San Carlos Bay, achieving an element of surprise against Argentinian forces. Within hours, Argentinian jets launched attacks on the landing fleet from their mainland bases, engaging British ships in a significant naval action. Every gun and missile system aboard the British vessels was brought to bear against the incoming Argentinian planes. American weaponry proved instrumental in this conflict, which constituted one of the largest naval engagements since the Second World War.
The American Sidewinder missiles were of particular importance, specifically the latest version which conferred a wholly new capability to the Harrier Jets. Unlike older Sidewinder models, which necessitated a launch from behind the target aircraft, the new variants allowed for head-on engagement. This capability was brilliantly and effectively utilised by the Harriers, compelling Argentinian pilots to fly at dangerously low altitudes to evade detection. Consequently, many of their bombs, dropped from such low heights, failed to arm and fuse upon impact, preventing significant damage to at least ten British ships that were struck. The decision to supply these advanced Sidewinders was a deliberate and critical choice made to safeguard Britain.
Beyond the Sidewinders, a comprehensive array of American weaponry was made available to Britain throughout the war. This included various other missiles, mortar shells, high explosive ammunition, night vision goggles, and specialized matting for Harrier landings. In one notable instance, a specific type of equipment, identifiable only as necessary for a landing operation, was requested and subsequently delivered from American stockpiles to the South Atlantic within an astonishing six hours. This demonstrated the American commitment to ensuring a British victory.
Despite the extensive support, American officials maintained that it was not "their war," as no American lives were lost in direct combat. Nevertheless, it was acknowledged that the United States would have faced an extremely difficult predicament had Britain appeared to be losing; such a scenario would have seen a key NATO ally and close friend defeated by a dictatorship in the South Atlantic, almost certainly drawing America into the conflict against its will.
Post-conflict analysis by American officials candidly revealed that Britain could not have achieved victory within the same timeframe or with comparable relatively low casualties without American support. The conflict would have been considerably more costly and protracted. The American assistance in communications and materials was deemed of "enormous importance," though it did not involve American personnel directly in combat. It was the firm conclusion of some officials that, had the American administration maintained strict neutrality, Britain would have been compelled to withdraw from the Falklands, effectively suffering defeat.
The candour of these American officials, even in a documentary released in 1988, merely five years after the conflict, was remarkable. It was understood that Britain's significant decline in military modernization and infrastructure throughout the 1960s and 1970s had left it unprepared for a prolonged engagement, even against a less technologically advanced, albeit highly trained and motivated, force like Argentina. Successive British governments had failed to invest adequately in modern communications gear, missile defences, and advanced weaponry like Sidewinders. Moreover, they had foolishly scrapped large aircraft carriers, even having the Invincible class carriers listed for sale to Australia at the very time the invasion occurred. This meant that Britain could not simultaneously aspire to be a "serious power and do it on the cheap," and the United States effectively compensated for these deficiencies.
Aftermath and Lingering Tensions
Britain's victory in the Falklands was undoubtedly a triumph for Prime Minister Thatcher. The crucial, albeit covert, role played by the United States remained a secret, understood as a private debt that would eventually require repayment. Despite the extensive American aid, Thatcher's gratitude was not effusive, as Britain paid for all the assistance received and viewed the support as an expected outcome.
The immediate aftermath did not witness a surge of pro-American sentiment in Britain; if anything, anti-Americanism, dormant since the Vietnam War, began to resurface. A significant catalyst for this resurgence was the proposed basing of new American medium-range nuclear cruise missiles at Greenham Common in Britain. European governments had initially requested these weapons, but as their deployment approached, public opposition mounted. Fears arose that the missiles would render Britain a more likely target for Soviet attack, and that statements from President Reagan and others suggested the United States might contemplate a nuclear war confined to Europe, thus sparing America.
The Greenham Common protests became the longest demonstration of anti-nuclear and anti-American sentiment Britain had ever witnessed. These protests, often involving middle-class women chaining themselves to fences, highlighted perceptions of US bases as dangerous, alien presences operating beyond British control. The American base commander, unfazed, permitted the women to remain indefinitely. The protesters believed they were entering American territory when crossing the fence, a perception reinforced by incidents such as police stating they could not obtain tea for arrested protesters because they had "no American money".
These large-scale demonstrations, widely covered on American television, caused significant concern in the Pentagon. The deployment became "touch and go," with the outcome of elections in some cases influenced by the issue. The American administration's greatest worry was the upcoming British election in June 1983. Michael Heseltine, then Minister of Defence, vigorously campaigned against the Labour Party's promise to remove all US nuclear weapons and bases from Britain. He emphasised trust between the US and UK, identifying the monolithic Soviet power as the true enemy and asserting a total unanimity of interest in deterring this threat. Some protesters were perceived as sympathetic to the Soviet cause, or even backed by Russia, adding to the government's concern.
Had Labour won and pursued its platform of ejecting American bases, the United States would have withdrawn its forces entirely from Western Europe, leading to the unraveling of the NATO alliance. This outcome, though counter to US interests, would have been pursued to prevent other Western European nations from following suit, thereby accelerating Soviet objectives in Western Europe through coercion and intimidation rather than direct conflict. In the context of the Cold War, remaining within NATO and hosting American deterrents was seen as a necessary safeguard against communist takeover.
Mrs Thatcher's return to office with a landslide majority, largely attributed to her Falklands success, brought the relationship between the two leaders to its closest point. Their bond, strengthened by mutual admiration and having supported each other against domestic opposition, was compared to that of McMillan and Kennedy, and even Churchill and Roosevelt. At an economic summit in Williamsburg, Thatcher notably pre-empted President Reagan's intended historical jest about the American Revolution, declaring that she would be presiding over the dinner had history taken a different turn. Later, at a British Embassy dinner, Thatcher consciously adapted a Churchillian phrase to underscore the ongoing Soviet threat, stating that while Soviet ideology viewed the West as "ripe apples ready to fall into their laps," they would find "some apple, some tree".
However, the limitations of the alliance soon became apparent. Just two weeks later, in October 1983, a Marxist coup on the tiny Caribbean island of Grenada led to a dramatic and puzzling rupture. Fearing another Cuba and the potential hostage-taking of American students on the island, the US State Department advocated for immediate invasion. President Reagan ultimately authorised the intervention. Grenada, however, was a member of the Commonwealth, with the Queen as its head of state. Hours before the invasion, a worried British Foreign Office had inquired about US plans, receiving assurances that there would be no American military intervention. This was publicly stated in the House of Commons.
Thatcher, having received an urgent midnight call from Number 10, was reportedly furious upon learning of the imminent invasion. Despite her personal closeness with Reagan, the Prime Minister argued forcefully against the invasion, though the final responsibility for protecting US citizens rested with President Reagan. This American action, taken against Britain's advice, caused public uproar in the UK. The Foreign Secretary, having publicly denied the likelihood of intervention, was perceived as having misled the House.
The American perspective was one of bewilderment. They had provided significant, secret assistance during the Falklands War, and saw Grenada, which they viewed as a Soviet-Cuban colony, as a far more pressing threat than the Falklands. The Wall Street Journal chastised Britain as a "fair weather ally". American officials acknowledged rapid, less-than-thorough consultation due to time and secrecy, but were puzzled by Thatcher's lack of stronger support. They presumed her opposition was primarily for domestic political reasons, allowing her to appear to object while understanding the necessity. However, Thatcher publicly articulated a principled stance against using force to enter other nations' independent sovereign territories, advocating persuasion over military intervention. This position, given the prior covert aid, seemed remarkably ungrateful to American observers and left the dynamics of the relationship open to interpretation.
Grenada served as a stark reminder that when American and British interests diverged, Britain could not expect special treatment. This lesson resonated with a growing segment of the British public concerned about America's influence. A poll revealed that three-quarters of Britons believed America would fire cruise missiles regardless of British objection. The first cruise missiles arrived in Britain on 14 November 1983, ahead of schedule, catching Minister of Defence Michael Heseltine by surprise, though he publicly denied this. Despite public pressure for British control over the missiles, the government insisted that existing consultation procedures with America were adequate, implicitly acknowledging that British opposition would be irrelevant anyway.
Conclusion
The Falklands War, while a military victory for Britain, highlighted its diminished capacity to act unilaterally on the global stage without significant American support.
The conflict temporarily reignited the Britain's 'Special Relationship' with the USA debate, yet subsequent events quickly exposed its enduring limitations and the asymmetrical nature of power.
Despite covert American assistance being pivotal to the British success, the subsequent disagreements over Grenada and the deployment of cruise missiles demonstrated that American interests, when in conflict with British preferences, would ultimately take precedence.
This period marked a complex phase in the Anglo-American Establishment , where dependence, gratitude, strategic calculations, and domestic political pressures converged to redefine the contours of their interconnected destinies.
The candour of American officials during and after the conflict, admitting Britain's military shortfalls and their decisive role in the outcome, provided a stark assessment of Britain's position as a serious power.